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which the states have provided for the care of mental patients; a situation which
conceivably could pose as many difficulties in terms of judicial policing as
have resulted from Brown v. Board of Education6" and its progeny.
GARY G. COOPER
6r7 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
REMEDIES
Awarding Counsel Fees • American Rule - Equitable
Exceptions • Private Attorney General
Theory . Limitations
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
95 S. Ct. 1616 (1975)
T HE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, in its decision in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,' denied the federal courts the power to
assess attorney's fees against a party to a suit, solely upon the court's
appraisement of the social value of a successful plaintiff's suit.
The Alyeska case arose out of the litigation to enjoin construction of
the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. The plaintiffs, three environmentalist groups,'
brought action in March, 1970, in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, to enjoin the defendant, the Secretary of the Interior, from
issuing permits to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System,3 which would allow
construction of the pipeline across public lands.' The plaintiffs alleged that
the Department of the Interior had failed to file an adequate "environmental
impact statement" as required under the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969,' and that the Secretary of Interior could not grant any request for
temporary land-use permits adjacent to a permanent right-of-way without
violating the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.8
1 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub. nom. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975).
2 The three environmental groups involved were the Wilderness Society, the Environmental
Defense Fund, and the Friends of the Earth.
3 A subsidiary of the oil company consortium developing the North Slope, later changed to
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
4 Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
5 42 U.S.C. § 4321 etseq. (1970).
6 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), provides in part that:
Rights of way through the public lands, including the forest reserves of the United States,
may be granted by the Secretary of the Interior for pipeline purposes for the
transportation of oil or natural gas to any applicant possessing the qualifications
provided in section 181 of this title, to the extent of the ground occupied by the said
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Alyeska became a party to the suit by intervention in September, 1971.'
In March, 1972, the Department of the Interior filed a revised environmental
impact statement.8 Following this action, the district court in August, 1972,
dissolved its preliminary injunction, denied a permanent injunction, and
dismissed the complaint.' The court of appeals reversed, holding that Congress
had meant for the right-of-way limitations to the Mineral Leasing Act to be
adhered to strictly,1" and therefore instructed the district court to enjoin the
Secretary of the Interior from issuing the special land use permits for widths
of land adjacent to the permanent right-of-way." Since this ruling made
construction of the pipeline impossible, the circuit court of appeals did not
rule upon the issue relating to the environmental impact statement."
Congress, in November, 1973, overrode the court order by enacting
legislation authorizing construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline. 3 In June,
1974, the court of appeals assessed half of plaintiff-appellants' attorneys' fees
against Alyeska, justifying the shifting of fees under the "private attorney
general" theory, which holds that an individual citizen or group that brings
suit on behalf of the public, to effectuate compliance with the law, should not
be required to bear the cost of the litigation.' The court indicated that the
other half of plaintiffs' counsel fees would have been assessable against
the United States, but that such assessment was barred by statute. 5 Thus, only
Alyeska sought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
pipeline and twenty-five feet on each side of the same....
Alyeska had requested "special land use permits" for the duration of actual construction of the
pipeline increasing the total width allocated for construction to 100 feet. See Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 1614 (1975); Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325
F. Supp. 422, 423 (D.D.C. 1970).
7 95 S. Ct. at 1615.
8 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
9Id. at 846.
10 Id. at 864.
It might fairly be said that Congress overreacted to the prior excesses of railroad
rights-of-way. But it is not our function when we pass on either the constitutionality of
statutes or their interpretation, to substitute our opinion as to what is wise for that of
Congress.... Congress chose not to be foresightful: it chose to retain control of the
width of pipeline rights-of-way over public land itself, and that decision must stand until
Congress chooses otherwise.
id. at 893.
12 Id. at 889. "[A] ruling on the NEPA issues will not affect the real outcome of the present
litigation. Our holding that the special land use permit for construction purposes is illegal under
the Mineral Leasing Act makes it impossible to construct this pipeline until Congress decides
to amend the Act."
13 30 U.S.C.A. § 185 (Supp. 1975).
14 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For the rationale of the
"private attorney general" theory see notes 35-36 and accompanying text infra. See also Note,
Private Attorney Generals' Fees Emerge from the Wilderness, 43 FoRDHAM L. REv. 258 (1974).
15 495 F.2d at 1036.
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The Supreme Court, on review, reemphasized its adherence to the
American rule by holding that each party to a civil suit must bear its own legal
costs, and that only under exceptional circumstances will the attorney's fees of
one party be assessed against an adverse party."
When the American rule is strictly adhered to even the successful litigant
cannot recover the cost of protecting his legal rights. In public interest
litigation this acts as a deterrent to asserting one's rights, since legal fees are
usually not offset by the recovery of damages.' This inequitable result has
brought the American rule under considerable attack in recent years. 8 Critics
urge the adoption of the English system,"9 which ordinarily provides for the
prevailing party to recover counsel fees."0 While the American judiciary has
not been willing to subscribe to the English system, they have modified
the traditional American approach through the application of equitable
exceptions. 2' Prior to the Alyeska ruling the private attorney general theory
had emerged as one of the major judicial exceptions to the American rule. 2
The private attorney general theory was first expressed in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.," brought in 1968, under Section 204A, Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 The court, in Newman, interpreted the Civil
Rights Act as requiring an award of attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff, in
all but exceptional circumstances.25 The Supreme Court in Newman held:
A Title II suit is... private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an
action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains
an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a private
attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress considered of
the highest priority.28
16 95 S. Ct. at 1628.
17 See Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58
CORNELL L. REV. at 1222, which states that: "Without court-awarded fees for the private citizen
litigating in the public interest, the call for individual citizen participation becomes hollow."
is See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 792 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]; Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a
Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963); Mayer and Stix, The Prevailing Party Should
Recover Counsel Fees, 8 AKRON L. REV. 426 (1975); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's
Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972).
19 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 18, at 798.
20 See Comment, Distribution of Legal Expenses Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940),
which compares the English and American rules. See also Posner, An Economic Approach to
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 399, 428, 437 (1973).
21 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text infra.
22 The two well-recognized judicial exceptions to the American rule are the "common benefit"
exception and the "bad faith" exception. See notes 39-40 infra.
23 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1970).
25 390 U.S. at 402. 6 Id. at 401-02.
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Thus, the private attorney general theory originated solely as a statutory
exception, sounding in the congressional intent to award attorney's fees to a
plaintiff who brought an action deemed to be in the public interest. However,
the private attorney general theory quickly outgrew its parent, the statutory
exception, and came to be applied as a third equitable exception, in cases where
statutes did not specifically authorize fee assessment against the losing party.
The growth of the private attorney general exception found apparent
support in two Supreme Court cases, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,2" and
Hall v. Cole.2" Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. was brought under Section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,29 a statute not specifically authorizing
the award of attorneys' fees. Here the Supreme Court justified fee assessment
against the defendant corporation under the established "common benefit"
exception,30 looking to the Securities Exchange Act only to ascertain that
Congress had not, by the terms of the Act, precluded equitable assessment of
fees.3 Hall v. Cole was brought under Section 102 of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,2 which, in its pertinent section, did not
authorize fee assessment, but which was "cast as a broad mandate to the courts
to fashion 'appropriate' relief." Again, in referring to the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, the Supreme Court did no more than determine
that "appropriate" relief included equitable fee assessment, so that the statute
did not preclude fee-shifting."3
Neither Mills nor Hall purported to establish the private attorney general
theory as an independent equitable exception. Nevertheless in La Raza Unida
v. Volpe,'" an action brought to enjoin a highway construction project, the
District Court for the Northern District of California applied the private
attorney general theory, as though firmly established. The court reasoned that
27 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mills was a stockholders' derivative action to void a merger.
2s 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1970).
30 396 U.S. at 393-94, where it is stated that: "[W]here the litigation has conferred a substantial
benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately
among them."
31 Id. at 390. The Mills' holding has been acclaimed along with Newman as the first step in the
destruction of the American rule. See Nussbaum, Attorneys Fees in Public Interest Litigation,
48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1973); Comment, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney
General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
733 (1973).
32 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970), which provides that: "Any person whose right secured by the
provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring
a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as
may be appropriate."
3 412 U.S. at 14.
3' 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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under Newman, the private attorney general theory was apparently a
recognized exception, and that based on the authority of the Mills decision, a
court in applying an equitable exception need only look to the congressional
intent to discern whether the statute involved did not preclude fee-shifting. It
therefore followed that:
Whenever there is nothing in a statutory scheme which might be
interpreted as precluding it, a "private attorney general" should be
awarded attorneys' fees when he has effectuated a strong Congressional
policy which has benefitted a large class of people, and where further the
necessary and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to
make the award essential. 5
Thus, the private attorney general theory was developed into an equitable
exception independent of any statutory language, resulting in an almost
automatic award of counsel fees to the plaintiff who brought suit for injunction
in the name of public interest. The Supreme Court in Alyeska rejected this
non-statutory expansion of the private attorney general theory; instead it
adhered to the American system of not awarding attorney's fees to the
prevailing party, except in the case where one of the two traditional
equitable exceptions is applicable. 8
Under the Act of 1853," ' Congress prescribed what costs may be asserted
against a party by the federal courts."8 The Supreme Court in Alyeska
proceeded to recognize the existence of only two generally accepted equitable
exceptions to the provisions of the Act of 1853. But the Court did not find either
exception, i.e., the "common benefit"3 " or the "bad faith"' " exception, appli-
cable to the present case. 1 In contrast to the Supreme Court, the court of appeals
recognized the private attorney general theory as an independent exception. 2
At issue in Alyeska, therefore, was the power of the federal courts to create
equitable exceptions to the American approach absent statutory authority.
35 1d. at 98.
36 95 S. Ct. at 1627-28.
37 10 Stat. 161 (1853) [now Docket Fees and Costs of Briefs, 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970)].
381d. The statute limits accessible costs in all cases to virtually nominal amounts.
39 Originally the "common fund" exception applied only where a common trust or fund existed
such that a beneficiary by bringing suit could obtain distribution of the fund on behalf of all
the beneficiaries. The attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiff beneficiary would be deducted
from the fund prior to distribution, thus ensuring that all beneficiaries bore the cost of securing
the fund. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1882); see also 95 S. Ct. at 1635
(Marshal, J., dissenting), arguing the adoption and expansion of the common benefit theory.40The bad faith exception is applicable only where a party has clearly compelled litigation in
bad faith. Thus it is not applicable against a party such as Alyeska who litigated in good faith.
495 F.2d at 1029.
41 95 S. Ct. at 1622.
42 495 F.2d at 1030.
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The Supreme Court in Alyeska noted that Congress had created some
3041 statutory exceptions to the Act of 1853, which authorized the assessment
of counsel fees in limited situations. Since the private attorney general theory
arose in association with such statutory exceptions, the Supreme Court
concluded that the private attorney general theory could only be applied in
connection with exceptions based on statutory designation." It was upon this
rationale that the Supreme Court found the private attorney general theory
was not applicable in Alyeska."
The Supreme Court also noted a major inequity in fee assessment under
the private attorney general theory, which becomes apparent in such
circumstances as those present in Alyeska. Whenever an action for injunction
is brought against the United States, assessment of fees is barred by statute. '
In Sierra Club v. Lynn," an action to enjoin construction of a HUD-financed
community, plaintiffs brought suit against a department of the federal
government alleging a failure to file an adequate environmental impact
statement. Here as in Alyeska, the burden of paying plaintiffs legal expenses
fell not upon the federal government, which was immune, but upon the private
defendant, 8 San Antonio Ranch Ltd."9
Had it chosen to do so, the Supreme Court could easily have justified the
elimination of the private attorney general theory as an accepted equitable
exception on the grounds that it creates an inequitable taxing of fees against
an innocent party instead of the government. If the Supreme Court limited its
decision in this manner, the private attorney general theory would only have
been rendered inapplicable in a case such as Alyeska. Instead, the Court
decided to eliminate the private attorney general theory as a third equitable
exception, by holding that only Congress5" has the power to prescribe what
43 95 S. Ct. at 1623 n. 33. See, e.g., Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914); Securities Act of 1933
15 U.S.C. § 77K(e) (1933).
44 95 S. Ct. at 1623, where the Court stated: "Nor has it [Congress] extended any ruling
authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might
deem them warranted."
45 Id. at 1627.
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970), which states: "Except as otherwise specifically provided by
statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the
fees and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action
brought by or against the United States ..
47 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
48 Id. at 852.
49 Sierra Club v. Lynn was reversed by the Fifth Circuit as to assessment of fees, but only after
the present case had been decided by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 67 (5th Cir. 1974).
50 95 SCt. at 1627.
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fees may be assessed. 51 The Court concluded:
It appears to us that the rule suggested here and adopted by the
Court of Appeals would make major inroads on a policy matter that
Congress has reserved for itself.... [C]ourts are not free to fashion
drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party in federal litigation or to pick and choose among
plaintiffs and the statutes under which they sue and to award fees in some
cases but not in others, depending upon the court's assessment of the
importance of the public policies involved in particular cases. Nor should
the federal courts purport to adopt a rule awarding attorneys' fees on the
private attorney general approach when such judicial rule will operate
only against private parties and not against the Government."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argues that the majority has
determined that no equitable circumstances justifying fee assessment exists,
"simply because the claim does not fit comfortably within one of the previously
sanctioned judicial exceptions to the American rule."5 He further suggests
that fee-shifting should be permitted under the private attorney general theory
when the following three criteria are met:
(1) the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily
shared by the general public or some class thereof; (2) the plaintiff's
pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any, would not normally justify
incurring the cost of counsel; and (3) shifting that cost to the defendant
would effectively place it on a class that benefits from the litigation.5
Even in a limited form, the private attorney general theory could not
co-exist with the American rule. If attorneys' fees were awarded as a matter of
course in such cases as Alyeska, a plaintiff, purporting to act in the "public
interest" but alleging no real damages,55 would nevertheless be awarded
the cost of suing for an injunction, while the individual plaintiff, suing
for damages and alleging a direct and definite injury, would not be allowed
to recover attorneys' fees.
A trend is evident in recent Supreme Court cases, to discourage an
individual or small group from suing in the name of "the public" or a
denominated class.5 In Alyeska and a prior case, F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial
51 Congress itself presumably has the power and judgment to pick and choose among its
statutes and to allow attorneys' fees under some, but not others. Id. at 1625.
52 Id. at 1627. .13 Id. at 1629.
54 Id. at 1635. Under Justice Marshal's approach, the private attorney general theory would
bear a strong resemblance to the common benefit theory. See cases cited note 39 supra.
55 E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
56 E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (limiting ability of individuals to bring class
actions on behalf of large segments of the public); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972) (denying plaintiff standing to sue without alleging injury to members of plaintiff's
organization).
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RECENT CASES
Lumber Co.,5" the Supreme Court put an end to what it sees as unjustifiable
awarding of fees to plaintiffs by the lower courts. The message of Alyeska is
clear: He who would litigate for the benefit of the public must neither expect
that the courts will encourage him, nor the public will repay him, for his efforts.
JAMES LOCKHART
57 417 U.S. 116 (1974), holding that where plaintiff's cause of action is based upon a federal
statute, a court may not justify fee assessment by reference to the customary state practice
under a corresponding state law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Double jeopardy Juvenile Courts - Transfer to
Criminal Court Adjudicatory Proceedings
Breedv. Jones, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975)
T HE FIFTH AMENDMENT prohibition against double jeopardy1 is designed
to protect both federal and state' defendants from the embarrassment,
expense and ordeal of successive criminal trials, which not only create anxiety
and uncertainty in an accused, but also increase the danger that an innocent
person may be convicted.' However, as a result of the "juvenile court's assumed
ability to function in a unique manner"' a juvenile is not extended the
protection of the panoply of constitutional rights afforded an adult in a
criminal proceeding.5 Accordingly, the Supreme Court, in Breed v. Jones,6 was
called upon to determine the applicability and impact of the double jeopardy
clause on juvenile proceedings.
In February, 1971, a petition was filed by Breed, the Director of the
California Youth Authority, in the Superior Court of California, County of
Los Angeles Juvenile Court, alleging that respondent Jones, then 17 years old,
had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the
I U.S. CONST. amend. V, which states in relevant part: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
2 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). This case held the double jeopardy clause appli-
cable to state criminal proceedings through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
3 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
4McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
5Id.
6 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).
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